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In Need of an Extended Research Approach: The Case of the 
‘Neglected African Diaspora’ of the Post-Communist Space
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Associate Professor
This paper seeks to extend the academic discussion and research of the global African diaspora 
by drawing attention to Africans living in post-Communist spaces. So far, both literature and for-
eign policies of countries of the former Eastern Bloc hardly ever made mention of this ‘neglected 
diaspora’. First, the paper underscores the relevance of specific research connected with African 
communities across Central and Eastern Europe, as well as present-day Russia. Second, it intro-
duces the history, motivations, background and contemporary situation of the marginal but grow-
ing African population in Hungary. It will show how finally the Hungarian government implements 
a pragmatic foreign policy (partly) on Africa and African development co-operation. In this effort, 
it considers Africans who either had obtained a university degree before 1989 at a Hungarian uni-
versity, or came to the country during the democratic rule, as true bridges: they can foster newly 
defined relations. The place, role and potentials of these African migrants in the unique Hungar-
ian migration environment will also be discussed. Increased illegal migration flows towards the 
European Union via the Serbian–Hungarian border region of the Schengen Zone in the first half 
of 2015 and the policies the Hungarian government introduced in the wake of this unprecedented 
push makes the discussion even more topical, in particular, as of early April 2019, a government 
“Africa Strategy” was also published.  
Keywords: African migrations; global African diaspora; Africans in Hungary; Hungarian foreign 
policy towards Africa, Africa Strategy
1. Introduction
1.1. Opening Thoughts on the African Diaspora
“One of the accepted criteria of the study of the African Diaspora is the necessity of its focus on 
African and African-descended peoples.”2. The new political, social and economic realities of our 
increasingly globalized interpolar world have direct effects on international migration. Considering 
migratory trends and tendencies from the opposite angle, migration is truly a profound feature of 
the global context, which is best characterized by the accelerated pace of all types of movement. As 
Zeleza3 rightly points out, “two critical developments” can be isolated. “First, the diversification of 
1 Bolyai Research Fellow 2018-21. This research was supported by the Bolyai Fellowship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The article is partly based on the paper 
István Tarrósy: Extending Global African Diaspora Research: Africans in Hungary, the ‘Neglected Diaspora’ In: Kis Kelemen Bence; Mohay Ágoston (eds.) EU Justice 
and Home Affairs Research Papers in the Context of Migration and Asylum Law. University of Pécs, Faculty of Law, Centre for European Research and Education, 
(2019).   
2 G. A. Chambers. Mapping the Study of the African Diaspora: Classic Trends, New Themes, and Disciplinary Approaches, in, R. K. Edozie, G. A. Chambers & T. Ham-
ilton-Wray (Eds.), New Frontiers in the Study of the Global African Diaspora, Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, 2018, pp. 23-33.   
3 P. T. Zeleza: Contemporary African Migrations in a Global Context, African Issues, No. 1, 2012, pp. 9-14. 
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sending and receiving countries has been growing. Second, skilled migration has assumed greater 
importance in relation to both the actual flows” and to migration policies at all levels. “African 
immigrants are now part of the transnational communities that can be found in virtually all regions 
of the world.”4. The diasporas of Africans represent a major aspect of both international migration 
and the international relations of the continent. As Taylor underlines, “the very existence of the 
diasporas are now seriously considered by African states (and international development agencies) 
as important developmental assets.”5 Not only because of the remittances that flow back into the 
economies of their home countries, but also as they possess the potential of building bridges in bi- 
and multilateral terms between their sending countries and their chosen new countries. A number 
of governments of receiving countries think in this way and are pressured to foster policies that 
on the one hand encourage the integration of migrants, as well as contribute to mutually beneficial 
economic, industrial and other investment deals, together with health service-related, educational 
or cultural projects. They tend to emphasize a ‘triple-win’ scenario, in which both the sending and 
receiving countries (the old and new homelands), as well as the migrants themselves can cultivate 
gains. Although there are still some more traditional perceptions that argue that “the influence of 
diaspora groups aggravates conflict in their home countries as they either directly or indirectly 
support the conflict of parties in terms of logistics or, in particular, finances”, there has been an 
emerging other view that “sees diaspora groups as having the potential to reduce conflict […] fos-
ter[ing] democratization processes, contribut[ing] to positive economic development in their home 
country”. 6
Yet another group of governments tend to see migrants as threat to national identity, and therefore, 
support anti-immigrant policies. To be able to study and understand the African diaspora is to re-
search on migration in general, and to study global African migrations in particular. As Chambers 
underlines, “contemporary political and global economic realities have brought Africans in the 
diaspora into more contact and communication with each other than ever before”,7 which confirms 
the very nature and existence of transnational identities in the global arena. These transnational 
African migrant communities are not only a developmental assets for countries of origin, but also 
mean numerous opportunities of geopolitical positioning for countries of destination. Although 
Chambers is right that: “While most of the discourse on the African diaspora has centered on the 
Americas and the African continent, there is a growing interest in the Indian Ocean region”,8 ba-
sically nothing is said about the diaspora communities of Africans across post-Soviet countries. 
It is absolutely valid to include them in a wider academic discourse, as “the legacy of the African 
Diaspora in these places [too] further exposes the global scope of the dispersal”.9 As in any case, 
migration flows in different phases and streams result in the creation of a diaspora. In comparative 
terms, in the course of history, different regions have experienced different flows and streams, thus, 
it makes sense also to look at the intensity and dynamics of the development of certain African 
diasporas in distinct areas. According to Palmer, in general terms, “diasporic communities possess 
a number of characteristics. Regardless of their location, member of a Diaspora share an emotional 
attachment to their ancestral land, […] tend to possess a sense of ‘racial’, ethnic, or religious iden-
tity that transcends geographic boundaries, to share broad cultural similarities, and sometimes ar-
ticulate a desire to return to their original homeland.”10 Among the heterogeneous African diaspora 
communities we will use the term diaspora throughout the paper as defined by Oucho: “to denote 
people – usually of African descent – residing outside Africa, or within Africa in countries other 
than their own, as citizens and permanent or temporary residents, engaging in circulation as well as 
4 M. O. Okome: African Immigrant Relationship with Homeland Countries, in: J. A. Arthur et al. (Eds.), Africans in Global Migration. Searching for Promised Lands, 
Plymouth, Lexington Books, 2012, pp. 199-224.   
5 I. Taylor: The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa, New York, Continuum, 2010. 
6 L. Laakso & P. Hautaniemi (Eds.): Diasporas, Development and Peacemaking in the Horn of Africa, London, Zed Books, 2014. 
7 G. A. Chambers. Ibid. p. 29. 
8 G. A. Chambers. Ibid. p. 31. 
9 G. A. Chambers. Ibid. 
10 C. A. Palmer: Defining and Studying the Modern African Diaspora, Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, January 2018, p. 216.
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transnational lifestyles.”11 This will be applied to the not-so-known African communities living in 
Central and Eastern European countries.
1.2. Setting the Scene for the Hungarian Case
In 2015, the government of Hungary took some convincing steps in order to revitalize relations 
with Sub-Saharan Africa by launching its ‘Opening to the South’ foreign policy chapter. In order 
to achieve this, it is open to target the still relatively minor, but occasionally vocal community of 
immigrants and the main civic organizations that either the immigrants themselves established 
and manage, or are in contact with them due to various legal questions and general representation 
(these latter ones are Hungarian NGOs with a profile and expertise on migrants’ rights). In its brand 
new initiative published on April 2, 2019, the Hungarian government published a 22-point “Africa 
Strategy”, which in a number of instances, clearly calls for more cooperation with both a circle of 
partner countries as well as their citizens.
While Hungary has been experiencing the pushing flow of irregular migrants, it also needs to get 
prepared for more foreign citizens choosing its territory to settle in the forthcoming decades. In fact, 
it needs to solve the burning demographic issue of a shrinking population, and therefore become 
ready for accommodating different people with different cultural and linguistic backgrounds.12 The 
former “emigration country” – as Sik and Zakariás13 referred to it – with a traditionally very low 
record of internal migration is now seen as a transition country to get into the Schengen Zone of the 
European Union by illegal migrants from some Western Balkans countries (Kosovo, for instance) 
and Near Eastern countries (Syria and Iraq especially), as well as Northern Africa (or Sub-Saharan 
Africa via Northern African and Mediterranean routes). While this particular issue has been basi-
cally the most burning one for the country, the topic of Hungarians leaving the motherland and em-
igrate to other EU member states (among others) is hardly mentioned in political communication 
and heard in public discourse.
One of the questions this paper attempts to answer is whether or not and to what extent Hungary, 
being a comparatively “closed country” in Central Europe’s migration map has been managing 
certain aspects of international migration both from the perspective of its society and with regard to 
government policies. The research presented here hypothesized that younger generations are more 
open to the presence of immigrants and their participation in everyday life, which is an inevitable 
condition on the road of a more integrative society. The paper also visits the question of govern-
ment policy aspirations in terms of the relevance of connecting longer-term strategic goals to the 
engagement and contribution of different diaspora in Hungary – in our case, the Hungarian African 
communities in light of a dynamic ‘global opening’ in foreign policy. 
The paper opens with a first section taking a closer look at the unique features of Hungary from an 
international migration perspective. It then moves to discuss African immigration to Hungary using 
primary research results from the last couple of years, an output of the projects the author and his 
research team managed to compile. Interview excerpts will illustrate the set of arguments, followed 
by a summary of a questionnaire on Hungarian youth perceptions about African immigrants. The 
chapter also highlights the foreign policy dimension that can be useful for a future comprehensive 
immigration policy (which is still missing at the moment), with particular relevance to the ongoing 
implementation of a new Hungarian policy of ‘global opening’ to the ever so globalized world. The 
11 J. O. Oucho: African Diaspora and Remittance Flows: Leveraging Poverty?, in A. Adepoju (Ed.), International Migration within, to and from Africa in a Globalised 
World, NOMRA, Sub-Saharan Publishers, Accra, 2010, p. 140.
12 Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in his latest address to the nation (évértékelő=annual national report) on 10 February 2019, launched a new public policy to upgrade 
the birth rate of the country by encouraging women to give birth to more children, and therefore, meeting some pressing demands for balancing the currently shrinking 
population. Immigrants are not the solution, the prime minister referred to, but the method he proposed.
13 E. Sik & I. Zakariás: Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Hungary. Country Report prepared for the European research project POLITIS, Oldenburg, Interdis-
ciplinary Center for Education and Communication in Migration Processes, 2005, p. 6.
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prospects for a Hungarian Africa policy will also be sewn into the line of thoughts presented. The 
chapter finally offers a conclusion and indicates some further steps of continued research.
2. Hungary is Not a Country of Destination for Many
Although international migration has always been a characteristic feature throughout its history 
since the foundation of the Hungarian state in the first years of the eleventh century, migration as an 
issue in post-socialist Hungary has been considered as “a diaspora and security problem and most-
ly viewed as part of foreign policy rather than economic policy.”14 No doubt, with regard to labor 
market issues, for a call for a more economy-focused approach is valid, however, understanding 
migration in the global era needs an interdisciplinary approach. When arguing for integration of 
any kind, historic, social, ethnic, linguistic, cultural and foreign relations and human rights con-
siderations have to be taken into account for a comprehensive migration policy. This prerequisite 
is even more articulated when we accept the valid observation of Castles and Miller15 that “novel 
forms of interdependence, transnational society and bilateral and regional cooperation are rapidly 
transforming the lives of millions of people and inextricably weaving together the fates of states 
and societies.” In addition, policy-making in the field first draws our attention to the obvious issue 
of security, then, to how useful the given migrant can be for the economy of the receiving country 
intending to regulate migration flows.
As Juhász notes, the first wave of immigration to Hungary – including “scribes, foreign merchants, 
artisans, and agricultural settlers” – was “primarily motivated by economic considerations, as well 
as King Stephen the First’s (1000–1038) positive attitude towards immigration.”16 Since the 1880s 
for about a hundred years, Hungary had been an emigration country: “between 1881 and 1900, 
370,000 people emigrated to America. In the 15 years that preceded the First World War the total 
number of emigrants reached 1.4 million.”17 The Treaty of Versailles signed with Hungary after the 
world war in the Grand Trianon Palace of Versailles on June 4, 1920, resulted in the loss of more 
than two thirds of its original territories (72 percent) and 64 percent of the total population of the 
country (21 million), due to Hungary’s alignment with the defeated central powers led by Germany. 
Coupled with the consequences of “large-scale forced resettlement movements” after the Second 
World War, “as a result of all these changes, on the one hand an ethnically highly homogeneous 
population was created on the territory of modern Hungary, on the other hand an ethnically mixed 
population with considerable Hungarian minorities emerged in the countries surrounding Hunga-
ry”18. The total number of Hungarians living beyond the borders of the country, the Hungarian di-
aspora is about 5.2 million, out of which 2.6 million ethnic Hungarians can be found in Hungary’s 
present-day neighbors (most of them, about 1.5 million in Romania), 1.8 million in North America 
(most of them, about 1.5 million in the USA), and the rest all across the world.
With the Soviet bloc disintegrating at the end of the 1980s, Hungary had to face a substantial in-
flow of refugees and asylum seekers from the neighboring countries, but mainly from Romania and 
former Yugoslavia as a result of the ongoing conflicts and war on their territories. This migratory 
push then turned into another flow of migrants with economic and study purposes from the same 
countries surrounding Hungary. “The annual number of immigrants between 1988 and 1991 ranged 
between 23,000 and 37,000, and about 80 percent of them were ethnic Hungarians from Romania, 
Ukraine and Yugoslavia.”19
14 Á. Hárs & E. Sik: Hungary, in E. Hönekopp & H. Mattila (Eds.), Permanent or Circular Migration? Policy Choices to Address Demographic Decline and Labour 
Shortages in Europe, Budapest, International Organization for Migration, 2008, p. 73.
15 S. Castles & M. J. Miller: The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World, New York, The Guildford Press, 1998. p. 1.
16 J. Juhász: Hungary, in T. Frejka (Ed.), International Migration in Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States, New York, United 
Nations, 1996, p. 69.
17 J. Juhász, Ibid. p. 70.
18 Á. Hárs & E. Sik, Ibid. p. 73.
19 Á. Hárs & E. Sik, Ibid. p. 74.
Pécs Journal of International and European Law - 2019/I-II.
-88-
One of the most unique features of Hungary’s migration scene derives from the above tendencies, 
the country’s historic heritage and geographic location: “the overwhelming majority of immigrants 
are from neighboring countries and mostly have an ethnic Hungarian background.”20 Therefore, 
Hungarian society at large does not really have experience on a greater scale with people of far-
away lands and cultures, which the population considers different “enough” from the majority 
society, as they had got used to receiving immigrants of European origin – mainly from the larger 
Hungarian cultural context. These immigrants speak no different language than the one the citizens 
of the motherland do, i.e. Hungarian. Up until the end of the first decade of the twenty-first centu-
ry the proportion of the immigrant population – that is “foreigners who stay in the country over a 
year”21 – compared with the native population shows a stable 1.5 to 2 percent according to the sta-
tistics of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO) on an annual basis.22 This is considered 
as rather low in a country with a total population of 9.778 million, according to the 2018 HCSO 
data. Since 1981 Hungarian population has been steadily decreasing (see Figure 1 for the last 15 
years). “The fall in the population number due to natural decrease was somewhat moderated by the 
positive net international migration in the last two and a half decades. However, in the last decade, 
immigration surplus could compensate only less than half of the natural decrease.”23 Since the 
breakout of the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’, the Hungarian government favors a strictly anti-immigrant 
policy, with nation-wide campaigns including slogans such as “If you come to Hungary, you must 
respect our culture!”, or “If you come to Hungary, you cannot take away the jobs of the Hungari-
ans!”. As Drinóczi and Mohai underlines: “The billboard campaign and the ‘national consultation’ 
were successful political tools used to make the Hungarian population fearful of migration, or at 
least develop increasingly negative attitudes thereto due to economic and security reasons.”24After 
the latest landslide victory of his party at the national elections in April 2018, Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán clearly stated that: “We want that Hungary remains the land of Hungarians, the country of 
the ‘magyars’”.
Figure 1. Demographic Changes in Hungary between 2003 and 2018
Source of data: Hungarian Central Statistical Office
20 A. Kováts & E. Sik: Hungary, in: A. Triandafyllidou & R. Gropas (Eds.), European Immigration. A Sourcebook, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2007, p. 158.
21 A. Kováts & E. Sik, Ibid. p. 159.
22 The International Migration Outlook 2012 of the OECD also confirms this figure. See OECD (2012: 236).
23 G. Vukovich et al. (Eds.): Population Census. 1. Preliminary data, Budapest, Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2012, p. 7.
24 T. Drinóczi & Á. Mohai: Has the Migration Crisis Challenged the Concept of the human Rights of Migrants? The Case of Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary, in E. Kuzelews-
ka, A. Weatherburn & D. Kloza (Eds.), Irregular Migration as a Challenge for Democracy, Intersentia, Cambridge, 2018, pp. 99-100.
Pécs Journal of International and European Law - 2019/I-II.
-89-
Hungary’s ageing and shrinking society, however, may also need immigrants – similarly to other 
European countries. However, in the last three years the number of legal immigrants (mainly for-
eigners who stay in the country for over a year, but also labor migrants who come for shorter peri-
ods) has not been on a painful increase. When the stock of this community of foreign nationals is 
looked at closely, for instance as in 2018, according to the figures provided by the Hungarian Cen-
tral Statistical Office, most of the migrants came from Europe (64.4 percent), while 27.6 percent 
were from Asia (44.5 percent of the Asians are Chinese), 3.6 percent from America (57.3 percent 
of the Americans are from the U.S.A.), 3.6 percent from Africa, and 0.4 percent from Australia and 
Oceania.25 
With regard to illegal migration, as Kováts and Sik note about the tendencies of the first years of the 
new millennium that: “most undocumented immigrants are weekly or monthly commuters from the 
neighboring countries [working] in the seasonal sectors (agriculture, construction) of the informal 
economy.”26 Concerning refugees and asylum seekers, 2015-16 tendencies indicated an ever so 
heavy push on the borders Hungary shares with Serbia in the south and with Ukraine in the north – 
apart from the constant push on Italian, French, Spanish or British EU-borders. These are borders 
of the Schengen area of the European Union (EU), meaning the external border of the community, 
and therefore, here border control is the most comprehensive. Those member states – thus Hunga-
ry, too – with external EU borders had to face more challenges in recent years. The 2013 data of 
Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union, showed that the number of those asking for 
asylum in the EU has risen by 50 percent compared with the year before. “The number asking for 
asylum has increased almost ten-fold compared to last year: some 17,000 by the end of October.”27 
As the article of EUrologus on the news portal index.hu of November 12, 2013 also suggested that 
experts can only guess why it is Hungary where such a huge increase had happened.28 As of August 
2015, more than 100,000 people reached Hungary, which was statistically the highest number ever. 
It seemed rather obvious that more people traveling from the Near East and North Africa decided to 
take the “Balkans Route” via Turkey, Greece, Romania, and even more Serbia, ending in Hungary. 
However, these migrants did not consider Hungary as their country of destination, but more as a 
transit territory toward Austria and Germany, and even farther towards the Western parts of the old 
continent. Hungary can still be considered not a “major destination for international migrants”.29 
According to a recent study investigating the refugee situation in Hungary offered a conclusion 
that: “Factors such as income, unemployment, trade or aid did not influence asylum-seekers in their 
choice of Hungary, nor did the increasing harshness of the Hungarian border, at least until the end 
of 2015, when the government started building a fence and significantly increased patrols along 
the border, nor in 2016.”30 The authors of the study agreed with other scholars that many of these 
asylum-seekers “despite lodging their applications in Hungary, most likely view it as a transit coun-
try along their route.”31 As for the numbers from the African continent especially, already in 2017, 
Hungarian authorities reported that out of a total number of 3,397, 2,532 people arrived in Hungary 
(comparing sending countries from where at least 5 persons arrived) representing 11 countries: the 
majority from North Africa, mainly from Algeria (710), Algeria (1,033), Egypt (218) and Tunisia 
(67). (Hungarian Statistical Office, 2017) Others from Sub-Saharan African territories included: 
Somalis (331), Ethiopians (32), Nigerians (83), as well as people from Sierra Leone (7), Mali (14), 
Cameroon (15) and Sudan (22).32 
25 Central Statistical Office: Foreigners in Hungary according to continents, countries and gender, as of January 1 of the given year, from 1995, Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office, 2013. http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_wnvn001a.html?476 
26 A. Kováts & E. Sik, Ibid. p. 163. 
27 Politics.hu: Hungary struggles with huge rise in asylum demands. Politics.hu. November 15, 2013, http://www.politics.hu/20131115/hungary-struggles-with-huge-
rise-in-asylum-demands/ 
28 Index.hu: Robbanás előtt a Magyar menekülthelyzet [Exploding refugee situation in Hungary], Index.hu, 2013, http://index.hu/kulfold/eurologus/2013/11/12/robban-
as_elott_a_magyar_menekult-helyzet/ 
29 OECD: International Migration Outlook 2012, Paris, OECD, 2012.236. 
30 A. Tétényi, T. Barczikay & B. Szent-Iványi: Refugees, not Economic Migrants – Why do Asylum-Seekers register in Hungary?, International Migration, Special Issue, 
November 2018. pp.15-16. 
31 A. Tétényi, T. Barczikay & B. Szent-Iványi, Ibid. p.16. 
32 See: https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_wnvn002b.html (30 October 2019).
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3. Africans in Hungary 
The situation was different before the democratic changes of the early 1990s – though not sub-
stantially different. As one of the ‘closed countries’ of the Eastern Pole of the Cold War, being a 
satellite of the Soviet Union, Hungary did receive thousands of foreigners during the 1970s and 
1980s, among which young people undertaking university studies and holding state scholarships 
from the friendly Hungarian state represented several African countries. When searching for aca-
demic pieces in the scholarly literature on migration from Africa to Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs), one can hardly find anything specific to set off from. The pool scarcely covers 
this system of connections; it is indeed a neglected area of migration research. Most articles speak 
about African migration to Europe in a historical perspective, but hardly ever make mention of the 
former Soviet bloc, and this cannot be explained with the seemingly obvious reason of the substan-
tially larger numbers having migrated to the more Western European states (many of them former 
colonizers) in the course of the centuries. One of the most frequently quoted papers about Afri-
cans in Hungary is Larry Olomoofe’s book chapter from 2001, which the present discussion also 
uses mainly because of its original sociological observations, which underline the findings of the 
research led by the author of the current chapter with his team between 2009 and 2013.33 Another 
important and highly relevant piece is the summary of the first results of another ongoing research 
in Russia led by Dmitri Bondarenko at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy 
of Sciences. We could not agree more with Bondarenko et al. in pointing out that “without taking 
migrations to Russia [and to the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe] into serious 
account any research on migration processes and their consequences at the European (or wider) 
level would be a priori incomplete and imperfect.”34
Concerning the geographical distribution of African immigrants in Hungary, the majority can be 
found in Budapest, the country’s political, financial and cultural center. In 2009 this meant about 
65 percent of the total African community, in 2010 the figure was almost the same, 61 percent, and 
it has not substantially changed ever since. The second largest group is about 12-15 percent of the 
total African immigrant population staying in the Northern counties of the country. Almost all of 
the Africans live in larger urban settlements, mainly in the bigger university towns or in their ag-
glomeration. As for the total numbers, Figure 2 shows the tendencies between 2001 and 2018. Up 
until 2000 there had been an increase of African inbound migration with over 2,600 people at its 
peak in 1998. Figure 3 then compares the number of Africans with the total number of foreigners 
in the country between 2003 and 2018.
33 I. Tarrósy: African Immigrants in Hungary: Connection with the New National Foreign Policy, Society and Economy, No. 2, 2014, pp. 285-305.
34 D. M. Bondarenko, E. A. Googueva, S. N. Serov & E. V. Shakhbazyan: Postsocialism Meets Postcolonialism: African Migrants in the Russian Capital, Anthropological 
Journal of European Cultures, No. 2, 2002, pp. 87-105.
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Figure 2. Number of Africans in Hungary between 1995 and 2018
Source of data: Hungarian Central Statistical Office
Figure 3. Number of Africans in Hungary in Light of Total Number of Foreigners between 2003 and 
2018
Source of data: Hungarian Central Statistical Office
When looking at the countries of origin of legal African migrants in Hungary, a very colorful pic-
ture can be drawn as almost all the countries of the continent are represented. As Figure 4 indicates 
that the majority of the Africans who were staying in Hungary between 2009 and 2010 were from 
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countries of North Africa. The real figure of this group of Africans was above 40 percent both in 
2009 and 2010. As for the most populous nation in Hungary, Nigeria led the list with more than 730 
people in 2010. If the goals of migration are examined, out of the total immigrant population offi-
cially requesting residence permit during the first nine months of 2012 and the same period in 2013 
respectively, 921 and 1,040 Nigerians stated study-related purposes, which meant 10 percent of the 
total number in the study-related category (altogether 8,927 and 10,400 respectively).35 With regard 
to gender statistics, more than two-thirds of all the African migrants were male. In 2017, 20.54 per 
cent of the African immigrants came from Nigeria and the rest from various African countries.36
Figure 4. African Immigrants According to Countries of Origin, 2009–2010
Source of data: Hungarian Central Statistical Office
Supporting again Bondarenko et al., similarly to the situation in Russia and other post-Soviet states, 
“Nigerians are surely most advanced in the sphere of ‘diaspora building’”37 in Hungary as well. 
Analyzing the African population in the Hungarian capital from the perspective of distinct African 
identities and potential conflicts, Olomoofe points out that “regional differences, i.e. ‘inter-state’, 
and internal ethnic/tribal differences, i.e. ‘intra-state’, are relegated to a minor position in the daily 
interactions”.38 It is relevant to talk about a ‘community’ of Africans also in Budapest, with the 
obvious inter-state and intra-state differences among its nationals. 
As a major sector of activities, the civil sector offers the opportunities for creating a community 
of black people. A 2011 IDResearch survey also confirmed that legal African migrants in Hungary 
are active in the cultural and NGO sectors, and they take part in humanitarian and philanthropic 
activities – for example, make efforts to fundraise (either in financial or in-kind terms, or both) for 
schools, orphanages in different African countries (mostly their countries of origin). France Mu-
tombo, a Congolese-born Adventist pastor with a Hungarian wife has been one of the most active 
Africans in the country.39 For more than 15 years he has been running the NGO Foundation for 
Africa, with which he manages a school and an orphanage in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo.40 He also arrived in Hungary to earn a university degree in the 1990s, and has become 
35 Based on the statistics of the Office of Immigration and Nationality (2013).  http://www.bmbah.hu/statisztikak.php.
36 Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2018. http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_wnvn001a.html?476
37 D. M. Bondarenko, E. A. Googueva, S. N. Serov & E. V. Shakhbazyan, Ibid.
38 L. Olomoofe: Africans in Budapest: an emerging subculture?, in: P. Nyíri et al. (Eds.), Diasporas and Politics, Budapest, MTA PTI, Centre for Migration and Refugee 
Studies, 2001, p. 63.
39 The interview with France Mutombo was published in the Hungarian African Studies journal in 2009, see. “France Mutombo”, Afrika Tanulmányok 3(2), p. 56-62.
40 I. Tarrósy: It Can Also Be Done from Central Europe – Hungarian Humanitarian Involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, CIHA Blog May 4, 2013, http://
www.cihablog.com/it-can-also-be-done-from-central-europe-hungarian-humanitarian-involvement-in-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/.
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a well-known African across the country showing a positive example to the Hungarian society 
at large about the substantial contributions and impact immigrants can make in their chosen new 
home country and beyond.
Drawing upon Olomoofe, the idea of a community of black people in Budapest “is constructed 
by ‘outsiders’, which hints at the existence of a racial/ethnic discourse, similarly to that about the 
Roma, within which black people are placed by the locals.” He argues that, “although many of 
these people have not encountered explicit racist behavior, implicit experiences of racism force 
Blacks together, creating a sense of solidarity.”41 All this was affirmed by many of the interviewees 
of an IDResearch project. Teddy Eyassu, for instance, an Ethiopian with a PhD in International Re-
lations from Corvinus University of Budapest was attacked by skinheads in 1992 – two years after 
he had arrived in the country. The case was taken to court, and Teddy asked the judge to pardon 
those who beat him up. After the incident he developed friendship with the former attackers. In his 
interview,42 Teddy recounted the following story:
You can see other instances when Africans are offended still today. Two-three weeks ago, for 
example, one of the students who came to study in Budapest with a scholarship told me that 
he went to a pub with some friends. They saw a company there who was talking about them, 
which they did not understand because of their very limited Hungarian, but suddenly they 
heard them saying ‘néger, néger’ [meaning nigger]. Some members of that group had their 
cigarettes half smoked, then, threw the rest onto the shirt of one of the African boys. One of 
the attackers held a chair above his head intending to have a fight using it, and they all cried 
‘monkey, monkey’. […] There are atrocities, but you cannot generalize. This is truly not a 
feature of Hungarian society at large.
The term ‘néger’ is commonly used for black people, and as Olomoofe rightly underlines, “is per-
ceived as neutral by most people.”43 It is in the Hungarian language, most probably deriving from 
centuries-long non-experience and knowledge about black people in general, that it does not have 
the negative connotation black people attach to it. This negative connotation is rather attached to 
the word ‘nigger’, which is also used in the language, but that is a very offensive term.
Among other factors, the “attitude of the natives does turn out a significant factor of migrants’ 
adaptation / non-adaptation”44, and for any successful integration from both sides open-minded 
and inclusive attitudes and perceptions are desirable. A well-known media personality, Sorel-Ar-
thur Kembe, who has appeared on numerous TV channels either as an actor in soap operas, or a 
reporter in talk shows, is a son of a Congolese father (from Congo-Brazzaville) and a Hungarian 
mother. His father also migrated to Hungary for study purposes in 1973, and as opposed to many 
of his classmates who returned to their home country, he stayed and established his family. In an 
interview with the journal Afrika Tanulmányok, Sorel recalled his feelings about the atrocities he 
had experienced at the early 1990s: “I went through an interesting character development those 
days. First, I was afraid of the skinhead fellows, then, became angry with them, finally, I turned into 
unconcerned and rather impassive about them.”45
Most scientific views on contemporary Hungarian society, which is considered as ethnically homo-
geneous – apart from a rising percentage of the Roma, which is the largest ethnic minority in the 
country – seriously calculate with xenophobia in the context of immigration. “Homogeneity and 
closedness are partly the explanation of the stable and relatively high level of xenophobia which 
41 L. Olomoofe, Ibid.
42 Also published in the Hungarian African Studies journal in 2009: “Tadesse Eyassu.” Afrika Tanulmányok 3 (3-4), p. 42.
43 L. Olomoofe, Ibid.
44 D. M. Bondarenko, E. A. Googueva, S. N. Serov & E. V. Shakhbazyan, Ibid. p.12.
45 Interjú: Kembe Sorel-Arthur sportoló, műsorvezető, színész. Afrika Tanulmányok 5(3), p. 82, 2011. 
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has increased after the fall of Communism.”46 As Hárs and Sik report, “time series analysis of the 
level of xenophobia shows that one third of the Hungarian population would close Hungary’s bor-
ders (open xenophobes). […] The opposite group (“super-liberals”) is rather small (3%). The third 
group (“realists”) contains approximately two-thirds of the Hungarian population and has always 
been the dominant group.”47
Sliman Ahmed from Mauritania, who as a former socialist state scholarship holder obtained his 
degree in Engineering from the Budapest University of Technology in 1976, has always had a very 
positive view. As one of the most active NGO leaders being the president of the Sahara Foundation, 
he says he has a lot of Hungarian friends and supporters. 
I can only say positive things. Hungarians are hospitable and helpful. I saw Africans speaking only 
in English and asking for help in the street, the Hungarian they approached was using his arms and 
legs just to offer help in showing the requested direction. […] If I ever return to Mauritania for good 
I will certainly bring along with me this Hungarian mentality and culture.48
“To us, Hungary is our second home and irrespective of the fact that we were not born here, we live 
here, we have our families here, and we have exactly the same problems as our Hungarian friends,” 
comments on his identity Josephat Rugaika, President of the Hungarian Society of Tanzanians.49 
The young NGO with its experienced management – President Rugaika came to Hungary in 1975 
to earn a university degree in Chemical Engineering – wants to build on the embracing attitude that 
was prevailing in the 1970s among the African migrants of the time. “There were different student 
associations for Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian students, but we came together often to celebrate 
as a big family. This has not changed a thing; today we act in the same way. We consider, for in-
stance, the Kenyans as our brothers and sisters”.50
Many of the Africans who got their university education during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s married 
Hungarians, and established their families in Hungary. Some of them draw our attention to another 
linguistic peculiarity, the outdated term ‘félvér’ (half-blood), which is still in use when referring to 
their children. Raymond Irambo, working today as an electrical engineer, who arrived in Hungary 
as another state scholarship holder from Congo-Brazzaville in 1982 feels that the Hungarian term 
possesses a negative connotation, in particular how it was used in kindergarten, as he remembers 
how the teachers uttered it when talking about his children. The majority of second-generation 
African-Hungarians prefer being called ‘white coffee’ to ‘half-blood’. Irambo’s children think their 
father is the coffee, their mother is the milk, and they are these two in one.51
4. Foreign Policy of ‘Global Opening’52, the Potential for an ‘Africa Policy’53, 
Hungarian Africans and the Government’s “Africa Strategy”
A rather self-confident step toward the implementation of a ‘global opening’ to the rapidly chang-
ing world was taken by the Hungarian government taking office in 2010. A new position of ‘Deputy 
State Secretary for Global Affairs’ was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under-
scoring the strong intention to bring about changes in foreign policy and to reposition Hungary on 
the world map. A strategic document got green light after the Hungarian Presidency of the Council 
46 E. Sik & I. Zakariás, Ibid.
47 Á. Hárs & E. Sik, Ibid. p.101.
48 Excerpt from the interview published in Afrika Tanulmányok, see:. “Interjú Szliman Ahmeddel, a Szahara Alapítvány vezetőjével.” Afrika Tanulmányok 4(2): 64, 2010.
49 A. T. Horváth: Interjú Josephat Rugaikával, a hazánkban élő tanzániaiak doyenjével [Interview with Josephat Rugaika, the doyen of Tanzanians in Hungary], Afrika 
Tanulmányok, No. 3, 2012, p. 40.
50 A. T. Horváth, Ibid. p.38.
51 For more about Raymond Irambo and other Africans in Budapest see: J. Lángh: Budapesti afrikaiak [Africans in Budapest], Afrika Tanulmányok, No. 3, 2011, pp. 
70-77.
52 I. Tarrósy & Z. Vörös: Hungary’s Global Opening to an Interpolar World, Politeja, No. 2, 2014, pp. 139-162.
53 I. Tarrósy & P. Morenth: Global Opening for Hungary – New Beginning for Hungarian Africa Policy, African Studies Quarterly, No. 1-2, 2013, pp. 77-96. 
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of the European Union was handed over to the forthcoming Troika-member Poland for the sec-
ond half of 2011. In one of the most important foreign policy strategies since the political regime 
change, the Hungarian state clearly argues for a policy of ‘opening’ to the increasingly global and 
transnational world. It fosters the strategic decision about Hungary’s redefined stance on the ‘East’, 
including China, Russia and Central Asia, as well as the Middle East, but also on sub-Saharan 
Africa. In light of both a progressively evolving global ‘actorness’ of the EU on the supranational 
level and reaffirmed cooperation with the Visegrád countries, pursuing a stronger representation of 
regional interests, Hungarian foreign policy has a new perspective.
Within this context, Hungary wished to formulate its “own” ‘Africa policy’ – as one can be assured 
reading the policy document of global opening.54 Good reputation and a wide network of personal 
contacts in many countries of Africa can certainly contribute to successful implementation, if the 
approach goes further beyond official government rhetoric. Those young Africans who arrived in 
Hungary during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s with scholarships from the Hungarian state represent 
“an unbreakable link between our country and the continent,” according to the introductory text 
of the Budapest Africa Forum held between June 6-7, 2013, celebrating the 50th anniversary of the 
foundation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), predecessor of the African Union (AU). 
These individuals – who, as Hungarian graduates with partial Hungarian identities, or at least 
with the feeling of attachment to their former alma maters and Hungarian culture, also bearing the 
knowledge of the local language – can function as “ambassadors” to foster bilateral ties. The policy 
of global opening has a definite intention to do this by admitting that “Hungary needs to review 
how to address the problems arising from the short-comings of our network of representations in 
Sub-Saharan countries,” and underlining that more diplomatic representation is needed for suc-
cess.55 On October 29, 2013, State Secretary Péter Szijjártó informed the Hungarian News Agency 
MTI that Hungary reopened its embassy in Abuja.56 Today, the country operates 6 embassies across 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The latest it opened was in Luanda, Angola, where after more than three 
decades the Hungarian Prime Minister finally intended to pay a visit at the end of March 2019.57 
Despite serious diplomatic efforts, the bilateral meeting did not materialize, instead, the Primes 
Minister visited Cape Verde.
Hungary has a positive image in numerous African countries from two angles: first, it did not take 
part in Africa’s exploitation as a colonial power in a direct way (of course, it cannot escape from 
being part of the imperialist project as part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy), second, with many 
of its former products, such as the Ikarus buses or Hajdu washing machines, and even the Elzett 
locks and the streamlined diesel rail cars of the Ganz company can hold extra credits for refining 
and redefining relations. A good combination of utilizing ‘nostalgic’ feelings both of university 
studies and products, the resident African diaspora in Hungary representing many nations, together 
with a strengthened and extended network of diplomatic representations as part of a coherent and 
consistent government policy, is the ingredients of success in the long run. All these, however, need 
to be coupled with direct and immediate commitments (as in the case of the Libyan crisis) as an 
EU and NATO members state.
Hungary has several serious and direct security policy and geopolitical concerns and interests, as 
far as migration, peacekeeping or NATO duties are taken into account. In the spring of 2013, the 
Hungarian government took part in the French-led military operation ‘Serval’ in Mali with experts 
of the Hungarian Armed Forces.58 Also for Sub-Saharan African refugees, Hungary can be a poten-
54 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary: Hungary’s Foreign Policy after the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union, Budapest, 2011, http://
www.kormany.hu/download/e/cb/60000/foreign_policy_20111219.pdf.
55 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Ibid. p. 48.
56 See: http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/hungary-reopened-its-embassy-in-abuja (30 October 2019). 
57 See: https://hirtv.hu/hirtv_gazdasagi_hirei/szijjarto-tobb-magyar-vallalat-is-beruhazasokat-hajthat-vegre-angolaban-2478193 (30 October 2019).
58 HVG: Magyarok Maliban: megjelent a kormányhatározat [Hungarians in Mali], HVG, 2013 http://hvg.hu/itthon/20130308_Magyarok_Maliban_megjelent_a_kor-
manyhatar
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tial target-country (in hypothetical terms rather, as long as more extended diaspora linkages offer 
better solutions in other countries across Europe). Organized crime, international terrorism, AIDS 
and tropical diseases can all reach Hungary, too. Therefore, to contribute effectively to the stability 
of the region and to reduce poverty in the long run is Hungary’s best interest, while at the same 
time, presents a crucial moral obligation as well.
One of the most heated contemporary debates in the European Union is related to the ongoing ref-
ugee crisis. It is rather for internal (national) political gains to label asylum-seekers as ‘illegal eco-
nomic migrants’, however, the entire issue of increased international migration needs to be taken 
seriously, but holistically, with all its complexities. “As long as there is violence in the respective 
countries of origin, asylum-seekers will continue to apply for refugee status in Hungary [too].”59 
Concerning any future Hungarian Africa policy, the migrant communities and the diaspora-re-
lated ties in general certainly need to be revalued in the coming years. As an additional element, 
building up future connections, soft power can play a role also in the case of Hungary. Education 
and research are key factors in the reshaping of Hungary’s African presence, which can be a basis 
for further cooperation in the long run. Bilateral educational, cultural, and scientific agreements 
have been of great importance for Hungary for decades. The new Stipendium Hungaricum60 public 
scholarship programme, thus represents one of the most significant tools for the pragmatic foreign 
policy of Hungary and for the evolving Africa policy as well. It is basically a revitalisation of the 
scholarship programme of the immediate Socialist past. It was presented that a number of African 
countries Hungary’s relations had become loose after the regime change, but according to the gov-
ernment, these are “easy to rebuild, as nowadays young people [from] Africa [...] who have done 
their studies in Hungary keep good and extremely pleasant memories of the country and are more 
than ready to engage in cooperation.”61 By developing the Stipendium Hungaricum programme as 
a soft-power tool, Hungary’s main goal is to be able to develop economic relations and increase its 
economic strength. At the Hungarian embassies, special commercial auxiliaries and experts have 
been pursuing targeted activities to increase the volume of trade. The MNKH Hungarian National 
Trading House Cls. is also responsible for the development of economic opportunities. Moreover, 
further important actors of the foreign-economy government machinery, such as the Hungarian 
Export-Import Bank Ltd. (Eximbank), the Hungarian Export Credit Insurance Company Ltd. (ME-
HIB), and the Hungarian Investment Promotion Agency (HIPA) also back these efforts.
As of April 2, 2019, the Hungarian government published its 22-point “Africa Strategy”, which 
first and foremost is an export-oriented approach towards Sub-Saharan Africa. It also deals with 
other types of involvement ranging from continued participation in peacekeeping operations to 
providing an increasing number of scholarships to African students, to international development 
projects in the fields of water management, infrastructure development, cyber security and health 
sector-related technological contribution – to name a few.62 Although this is definitely an important 
list of direct and concrete involvement activities, which can strengthen Hungary’s commitments to 
African development, too, more obvious policies and actions are needed to reach out to the African 
diaspora living in the country and get them on board to intensify bilateral and multilateral relations 
with the respective African countries.
59 A. Tétényi, T. Barczikay & B. Szent-Iványi, Ibid. 16.
60 See: http://studyinhungary.hu/study-in-hungary/menu/stipendium-hungaricum-scholarship-programme (30 October 2019).
61 Országgyűlés Külügyi Bizottsága [Committee on Foreign Relations of the Hungarian Parliament], 2015, 7.
62 See in detail: Government of Hungary: About the Africa Strategy [Az Afrika stratégiáról], A Kormány 1177/2019. (IV. 2.) Korm. határozata az Afrika stratégiáról, in, 
Magyar Közlöny, No. 56., 2019.04.02., pp. 1861-1864.
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5. Conclusions
“From the 1950s through the 1980s,” as Kane and Leedy phrase, “migration [from Africa] to Eu-
rope followed the historical connections between colonial powers and their former colonies.”63 It 
is, however, not only because of, as they suggest, “the tightening of immigration laws in France 
and Britain at the end of the 1980s” that “migrants (especially refugees) began to land in countries 
without any colonial ties to their countries of origin.” As this paper has argued, the major political 
relations of the bipolar world did influence the migration of Africans toward the Eastern bloc of 
Europe and the Soviet Union from the 1960s up until the 1990s. Agreeing with Bondarenko et al., 
“in the global scale the coming of the postsocialist and postcolonial worlds in such a direct touch 
with each other makes clearer the complex and contradictory nature of globalization,”64 and that of 
international migration as part of it.
Hungary offers a unique case for migration research. The country’s rather closed (due to the former 
socialist era among others) and homogenous society did not accumulate experience and knowledge 
about foreigners from faraway lands, for instance, from China, Vietnam, or sub-Saharan African 
countries. However, with the change of the political system at the end of the 1980s, the country has 
been encountering different flows of foreign nationals – but most of the immigrants are from Eu-
rope, and with a Hungarian ethnic background from neighboring countries. Not only the majority 
population, but also institutions of Hungarian public administration need to become more prepared 
for new groups of immigrants. This is of prime importance as the push of irregular migration, 
especially refugees and asylum seekers since 2015 has grown along the Schengen borders of the 
country (about half of its 1,400 mile-long national border). Apart from this new push, however, and 
as opposed to false perceptions, Hungary is still not a target for immigrants; rather a transit coun-
try. Besides, it is again an emigrant country – similarly to some previous historic periods. Recent 
figures show that “the proportion of adult Hungarians working abroad or choosing to live in foreign 
countries has tripled in the past two decades”.65 Hungary again is “losing its best and brightest”.66
As many have said already what Kofi Annan formulated as: “there can be no doubt that European 
societies need immigrants,” the majority of whom are “industrious, courageous and determined. 
[…] They are not criminals. They are law-abiding. They do not want to live apart. They want to in-
tegrate, while retaining their identity.”67 African immigrants in Hungary are no different from this. 
Although there are no exact figures about their professional composition, from surveys and NGO 
activities (mainly events and reports) it can be stated that a large group of them are well educated 
and highly qualified, many of them holding university degrees. Through their personal and organi-
zational networks – as they are active in the NGO sector – they can make valuable contributions to 
Hungarian society, as well as to the development of bilateral connections and cooperation between 
their sending countries and the chosen new home country, in particular, to the success of the foreign 
policy of ‘Global Opening’ with its newest chapter on ‘Southern Opening’. The case of Budapest 
proves how they have constructed a ‘black community’, and as Olomoofe observes, a “distinct 
‘Black Budapest sub-culture’.”68 Even the government intends to approach and activate them to 
help build bridges as part of this new foreign policy doctrine.
The education of young people and efforts to include relevant information about international mi-
gration and the immigrants themselves in school curricula in the long run can be a key to clearer 
63 A. Kane & T. H. Leedy: African Patterns of Migration in a Global Era. New Perspectives, in: A. Kane & T. H. Leedy (Eds.), African Migrations. Patterns and Perspec-
tives, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2013, p. 2.
64 D. M. Bondarenko, E. A. Googueva, S. N. Serov & E. V. Shakhbazyan, Ibid. p. 17.
65 Politics.hu: Survey finds number of Hungarians mulling emigration tripled since regime change.” Politics.hu, 2013b http://www.politics.hu/20130221/survey-finds-num-
ber-of-hungarians-mulling-emigration-tripled-since-regime-change/
66 Z. Dujisin: Hungary Losing Its Best and Brightest, Inter Press Service, May 23, 2013, http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/05/hungary-losing-its-best-and-brightest/.
67 K. Annan: Migrants can help rejuvenate Europe, Financial Times, January 28, 2004.
68 L. Olomoofe, Ibid.
Pécs Journal of International and European Law - 2019/I-II.
-98-
understanding of the complexities of migration, and to successful integration. 
All these are especially relevant, as the Hungarian government has been firmly advocating a coun-
try without immigrants in the future. 
